By the opening of the Edwardian era, fire had long been the major enemy of theatres around the globe. Theatres themselves were commonly constructed with widespread use of flammable materials, and flame based lighting systems provided a high risk of ignition. Consequently, throughout history there had been numerous conflagrations which had originated on stage, and many theatres had been razed to the ground, often more than once.
According to the research of Herr August Foelsch, a German civil engineer, published in 1877, a total of 460 theatres in major cities around the World had been totally destroyed by fire in the preceding one hundred year period. London topped the list with 31, followed by Paris with 29, and New York with 26. New York's total is arguably the most damning since, for most of the period in question, New York had far fewer theatres than either London or Paris.
Foelsch also gathered information, where available, about the timing of fires - from which he published studies into the longevity of theatres and the most dangerous periods of the day. With regard to the former, Foelsch discovered that out 252 theatres considered, more than 25% had burnt down in the first five years after construction, and a further 45% within the the next fifteen years of operation. This suggested that more than two thirds of catastrophic theatre fires occured within the first twenty years of the building's lifetime, and, moreover, that the average longevity of those theatres considered had been a mere 22.5 years. Foelsch did not gather comparitive information on theatres which had never suffered a major fire, but, nevertheless, this was a strong indication that theatres, as a general rule, did not reach an old age.
As regards the timing of fires, Foelsch discovered that out of 375 theatres considered, 5.6% had burned down in the hour leading up to the beginning of a performance, 11.6% during a performance (a period of usually around three hours), and 22.6% within two hours after close of a performance - making a total of 40% of all theatre fires performance related. Allowing that theatres did not give performances every day, closing on Sundays and for weeks at a time during rehearsals, and that the performance hours only accounted for an average of one quarter of the hours in any day, the comparitive risk of a fire occuring during those hours was approximately trebled.
The reasons for this may be surmised as follows:
Naturally, those 11.6% of fires that did occur during the course of a performance were of by far the greatest concern. A theatre fire, regardless of the timing of the outbreak, was likely to result in significant loss of property, but if it happened during the course of a performance whilst the house was full it could also result in great loss of life. The danger in this respect extended beyond the direct effects of the fire itself. As well as the dangers from flames, heat, smoke and structural collapse, there was a risk of what was often a far greater killer - panic!
The need for far reaching measures was brought to a head by a string of fire disasters around the world during the latter half of the nineteenth century that did occur during performances with attendant widespread loss of life:
1857 (7th June) - Teatro degli Aquidotti, Leghorn, Italy.
A rocket, part of a fireworks display on the stage, ignited the scenic decorations and started a blaze that killed at least forty people and injured up to two hundred others.
1876 (5th December) - Conway's Theatre, Brooklyn, N. Y.
A sudden draft caused by opening a window led to a border coming into contact with hot borderlights and catching fire. The resulting blaze led to two hundred and eighty-three persons being killed - all from the upper gallery. The theatre had good exits but auxiliary exit doors for the gallery had been kept closed.
1881 (23rd March) - Theatre Municipal, Nice, Italy.
A gas explosion set fire to scenic decorations. More than one hundred and fifty persons were killed, mostly from the upper gallery.
1881 (8th December) - The Ring Theatre, Vienna.
The careless lighting of the border lights by means of an alcohol torch ignited a hanging border. The resulting blaze claimed at least four hundred and fifty lives (some reports put the loss of life at over six hundred).
1882 (24th December) - Tschernigow, Russia.
A gas-meter explosion led to a fire and resulting panic wherein several people were killed and 100 injured.
1883 (13th January) - Circus Ferroni, Berditscheff, Poland.
A carelessly discarded cigarette started a fire which resulted in two hundred and sixty eight fatalities.
1883 (25th June) - Dervio, Como, Italy.
A fire inside a theatre resulted in forty-seven fatalities.
1887 (25th May) - Opera Comique Theatre, Paris, France.
Scenery ignited from the gas-lights led to a major conflagration claiming at least seventy lives.
1887 (4th September) - Theatre Royal, Exeter, England.
A fire claimed one hundred and fifty lives. The blaze broke out on the stage during the fourth act of a production of "Romany Rye". Panic broke out as the audience dashed for the exits whilst the theatre quickly filled with blinding smoke. Most of the victims died on the stairs leading from the gallery, although some escaped by jumping from the windows into the street below. Henry Irving sent a donation of a hundred pounds towards a fund for the relatives of the victims. Inadequate ventilation was found to have contributed to the cause of the fire.
1888 (31st March) - Theatre at Oporto, Portugal.
A rope in the rigging loft came into contact with the border-lights and caught fire. As the fire spread, a panic broke out and, the safety exits being closed, a jam resulted in the corridors. Many persons jumped to the street from the windows, others followed landing on top of those lying wounded and killed in the street. Sailors and marine soldiers in the upper gallery were claimed to have used their knives to kill persons blocking their exit.
1897 (4th May) - Paris, France.
A fire at a Charity Bazaar held in a theatre in Paris cost one hundred and twenty-four lives with over two hundred injured. An investigation reported that none of the exits had been indicated and untreated velaria (canvas awnings) had covered the whole of the underside of the roof, contributing to the spread of the fire. Taking notice of this event, the London County Council instructed its Theaters and Music Halls Committee to prepare a report on what security was afforded by the existing law to protect the public against fire and panic in similar gatherings. Dismayed at being informed that its powers were in fact very limited, the Council then sought legislation to license any establishments to which the public were admitted.
The forensic sciences in the Edwardian period were not nearly so advanced as they are today, and in not a few cases the exact cause of a theatre fire would never be uncovered. This was due largely to the rapidity with which the flames spread among the vast mass of combustible material and to the totality of the devastation it commonly resulted in. The best information about the causes of theatre fires was of course derived from those fires which broke out during a performance, and to which there were ample witnesses to report where the fire had started and how it had spread. But these types of fires are, for obvious reasons, also the most dangerous and could lead to deplorable calamities.
The majority of those fires that did occur during performances broke out on the stage, and most were due to open and unprotected, or insufficiently protected, lights in too close proximity to, or amidst a mass of, unprotected and highly inflammable scenery, draperies, gauze, ropes, and woodwork. Among numerous other causes, the following all posed significant fire risk:
Adding to the fire risk were such items as:
The 'Reform Movement' of the Edwardian period naturally caused the vexed question of protection from fire to be closely scrutinised. As a result, great headway was made in the development of protective measures against the rise and spread of fire in theatres. 1880, Captain Shaw of the London Fire Brigade launched a massive survey of London theatres in an attempt to curtail the number of fatal theatre fires which had previously plagued the capital. As a result, amongst other innovations, the first system of street alarm posts was introduced. Even so, a fire at the Alhambra Theatre, Leicester Square, two years later almost claimed the life of an amateur fireman under a collapsing wall.
One important innovation was the introduction of carefully made and easily worked fire-resisting curtains - made of substantial but lightweight construction. On the Continent metal curtains were favoured, but in England a double asbestos curtain was more common. The London County Council preferred a steel framing with asbestos wire-woven cloth on both faces, the intervening space being well filled with slag wool. Such curtains were somewhat heavy and required careful counter-weighting to operate easily, but if well made and fitted provided a substantial barrier against the spread of fire and thus made a significant contribution to audience safety. They were not infallible however, as was soon to be demonstrated by events across the Atlantic.
1903 (December) - Iroquois Theatre in Chicago (USA)
A fire at the newly opened six storey Iroquois Theatre in Chicago (USA) claimed six hundred and two lives. The theatre was filled to a capaciy 1900 for the matinee performance of the musical comedy "Mr. Bluebeard", starring comedian Eddie Foy. The fire started among the scenery suspended above the stage when a piece of canvas brushed against a hot arc light. The on-duty fireman was only equipped with two tubes of dry powder which was completely ineffective to halt the fire which spread rapidly. Eddie Foy attempted to reassure the audience then called for the asbestos curtain to be lowered which would have prevented (or at least delayed) the spread of the fire into the auditorium. The curtain snagged on a projecting light fixture however, and could not be lowered, and the theatres fate was then sealed when the panicked players fled the theatre through the Stage Door - letting in a blast of fresh air which blew the flames under and beyond the stuck curtain. Chaos descended as the audience raced for the twenty-seven exits, only to find many of them locked, or operated by a mechanism with which they were unfamiliar. Some opened inwards which was impossible against the crush of bodies against them. As in the Exeter fire, those patrons in the balconies suffered worst, many died leaping to the main floor of the auditorium to escape the blaze, others leaped from a fire escape cut off by a fire below and died on the hard pavement. Ironically, on its opening the theatre had been advertised as 'absolutely fireproof' - the reality was that 'complimentary' tickets had motivated city inspectors to ignore the fire code and let the theatre open despite obvious safety defects. The resulting inquiry caused a national sensation and led to many of those involved (including Chicago Mayor Carter H. Harrison) being indicted - all those cases however were eventually dismissed on technicalities.
In England by this time the lessons had at last been learned and, following the recommendations of Captain Shaw, the London County Council had brought sweeping measures into force in a bid to end the long history of disastrous theatre fires in the English capital. The cheif rules introduced by the L.C.C. being:
The Lord Chamberlain's office also introduced a rule that where fire resisting curtains were fitted they must be lowered at least once during the course of any performance (being fully lowered in not more than 30 seconds from the time of release) to ensure their continuing proper operation.
Remarkably, a few of the theatres in London remained exempt from the bulk of these regulations - these were the 'patent theatres,' licenced directly by the crown, and in January, 1904, the L.C.C. published a scathing report on the condition of one of these - the Theatre Royal, Drury Lane. Unable to enforce any regulations save those pertaining to the exterior of the building and the securing of the exits, the Council had never-the-less sent the owners of the theatre a report the previous April recommending the measures that should be undertaken to bring the theatre in line with the current regulations. An inspection during a performance on the evening of the 8th of January, 1904, however, revealed that those recommendations had been completely ignored. Besides the generally deplorable state of the building structurally, the report complained of overcrowding with gangways completely blocked by patrons standing in the aisles or seated upon the steps, and of outer exits that were rendered unusable through being chained and padlocked. The report ended with the following conclusion: "We are therefore of opinion that the premises in their present condition cannot be considered safe from the danger of fire." A conclusion which was borne out four years later, when a catastrophic fire destroyed the building. Luckily, the blaze occured during a rehearsal behind closed doors, and no lives were lost.
Generally speaking, however, the new L.C.C. regulations, many of which were quickly adopted by other licencing authorities, together with the gradual replacement of gas with the much safer alternative of electric lighting, did much to improve the level of safety in theatres in the years that followed. So much so that, when a fire did break out during a performance at The Empire Palace Theatre in Edinburgh in 1911, although ten of the performers and stage staff died the whole of the audience of about 3000 apparently cleared the building safely in just under two and a half minutes.
| Author: Don Gillan, www.stagebeauty.net. |
| Primary Sources: Oxford Companion to the Theatre, 1st Ed. 1951; Oxford Interactive Encyclopaedia, (CD-ROM) 2002; Plus various other online and literary sources. |
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